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The effect of tax policy on the process of capital accumulation has long been 
an important subject of policy debates and academic research. The tax policy 
debate in the 1980s has been largely motivated by a concern over the rate of 
capital accumulation in the United States. Tax rules can affect the nation’s 
capital formation by influencing the return to saving and to investing in plant 
and  equipment.  However,  the  presence  of  international  capital  mobility 
requires policymakers  to design tax incentives from a different perspective 
from that  which  would  be taken  in  the  case  of  immobile  capital.  Savings 
incentives and investment incentives can no longer be treated as alternative 
devices to enhance domestic capital formation. Part of domestic savings may 
flow into investment projects abroad,  while domestic  investment incentives 
can bring in more foreign capital. If long-term capital in particular is mobile 
across  national  boundaries,  a  country  with  higher  domestic  tax  rates  will 
drive domestic businesses abroad, while a country with generous investment 
allowances will attract more investments in plant and equipment. 
Several  theoretical  papers  have  suggested  that  international  capital 
mobility  would  have  important implications  for  the  welfare  effects  of  tax 
policy  (e.g., Gordon  1986; Slemrod  1987; and Giovannini  1988). Using  a 
general equilibrium simulation model, Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1983) 
have  shown  that  the  effects  of  elastic  foreign  investment  flows  could 
dominate other effects of tax policy on welfare. Summers (1986) shows that 
international capital mobility can have potentially significant implications for 
the effects of taxes on international competitiveness and the current account. 
Despite the  importance of  knowing  the elasticity of  international capital 
flows with respect to rates of return, however, very few attempts have been 
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made to measure it. Hartman (1981,  1984) reports significant elasticities of 
direct  investment flows  with  respect  to  U.S. net  return  variables.  Using 
updated investment data and tax variables, Boskin and Gale (1987) provide 
estimates  that  also  confirm  the  basic  conclusions  in  Hartman’s  studies. 
While  these  studies  represent  the  first  serious  attempts  to  estimate 
elasticities, their estimation seems to be subject to measurement problems, 
as discussed later. 
The  profit-maximizing  international firm  will  try  to  optimize  over  the 
capital allocation between the  parent  and  the  subsidiaries, given different 
rates  of  returns  and  sources  of  funds  between  countries.  An  empirical 
analysis of  the tax effects on international capital flows entails a thorough 
theoretical examination of international firm behavior and the intertemporal, 
intercountry,  and  intercompany nature  of  direct  investment.  The  lack  of 
rigorous theoretical frameworks from  which  testable  implications can  be 
drawn,  combined  with  various  data  problems,  has  contributed  to  the 
sparseness of reliable empirical evidence in this area. 
The  purpose of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  I  attempt to  estimate the 
sensitivity of U.S. direct investment capital outflows to the U.S. net rate of 
return.  The  second and  more  general goal is to  address various potential 
misrepresentation  problems  with  empirical  models  in  this  area.  Such 
problems are partly due to the absence of  reliable data and to the lack of 
reliable theoretical underpinnings. 
Section 2.1  provides a brief  theoretical discussion of  various channels 
through which domestic tax policy can affect the home country firm’s direct 
investment abroad.  Section 2.2  discusses issues related  to  using  existing 
direct investment data in an empirical model and stresses the importance of a 
theoretical structure in  choosing a proper model.  Section 2.3 presents the 
empirical model, which is based on the theoretical framework developed in 
section  2.1,  and  the  estimation  of  equations  that  relate  U.S.  direct 
investment outflows to  the domestic net  rate  of  return.  A  brief  summary 
section follows. 
2.1  A Theoretical Framework 
The present section heuristically investigates three major channels through 
which domestic tax policy can affect the home country firm’s international 
direct investment. A more rigorous treatment of this issue is presented in Jun 
(1988). First, the tax treatment of  foreign-source income will have a direct 
relevance to the net profitability of  foreign investment. Tax rules applied to 
foreign-source income include the corporate tax rate, the foreign tax credit, 
and  the  deferral  of  home  country  taxes  on  unrepatriated  foreign-source 
income.  Second,  tax  policy  can  affect  the  relative  net  profitability  of 
investments  between  different  countries.  Specifically,  home  country  tax 
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rate, the investment tax credit, and depreciation allowances, will affect net 
domestic  returns  and,  accordingly,  the  relative  net  profitability  between 
domestic investment and foreign investment. Third, tax policy can affect the 
relative net  cost of  external funds between  different countries. Since the 
international firm can raise funds both at home and abroad, tax rules that 
affect the domestic net cost of funds, such as the tax deductibility of interest, 
will influence the relative net cost of  funds between countries and therefore 
the flow of investment funds. 
Tax policy toward foreign-source income has long been a subject of policy 
debate and  political  controversy.  Most  of  the  existing literature is  also 
concerned  with  this  aspect  of  the  tax  effects  on  international capital 
movements. One  major concern  regarding international investment is  the 
possibility for foreign source income to be taxed twice, once by  the host 
country government and again by  the home country government. In many 
industrial countries  including the  United  States,  a  credit  or  deduction  is 
allowed for taxes paid to the host country government in an effort to avoid 
double taxation.  Furthermore, the home country tax can be deferred until 
foreign-source income is repatriated to the domestic parent. Tax  deferrals 
combined with  the foreign tax  credit can have  a significant effect on the 
international firm’s investment and financial decisions. 
A  central  issue  in  evaluating tax  policy  toward  foreign-source income 
concerns  the  firm’s  method  of  financing  marginal  foreign  investment. 
Foreign operations can be financed in several ways. The most explicit form 
is the transfer of funds to a foreign subsidiary by the domestic parent. These 
parent transfers consist of  equity investments and intercompany loans. The 
retention of  earnings by  the foreign subsidiary is another major  source of 
funds. In fact, the sum of these two financing sources-parent  transfers and 
retained earnings-is  the definition of  direct investment in the balance of 
payments data. ’ 
The effect of  tax  policy on foreign investment is highly  dependent on 
whether parent transfers or retained earnings are assumed to be the marginal 
source  of  funds.  Traditional  researchers  have  either  ignored  retained 
subsidiary earnings or assumed a fixed dividend payout ratio so that they can 
regard  parent  transfers  as  the  marginal  source  of  financing  foreign 
investments. In  this  case,  while  the  home  country  tax  affects  foreign 
investment,  the  deferral  of  taxes  on  retained  earnings  will  reduce  the 
effective tax  rate  on  foreign  investment  below  the  home  country  rate, 
favoring capital outflows, if the home country tax rate is higher than the host 
country rate.  Hartman  (1985) challenges this  view  by  demonstrating that 
deferred  home  country  taxes  are  capitalized  in  the  market  value  of  the 
subsidiary  so  that  those  taxes  can  have  no  effect  on  the  firm’s  new 
investment decision. Since in this case the marginal cost or the equilibrium 
shadow value of capital is smaller than in the parent-transfer case, Hartman 
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whenever  feasible.  This  tax  capitalization  view  has  the  strong  policy 
implication that any special taxes on foreign-source income have no effect on 
the  marginal  investment decision of  mature  subsidiaries with after-foreign- 
tax earnings in excess of desired investment expenditures. 
Understanding the tax effects on international direct investment requires a 
proper model  of  subsidiary behavior since foreign investment is eventually 
undertaken  by  a  foreign  subsidiary.  One  might  be  tempted  to  treat  the 
subsidiary, as many  previous  studies implicitly  do, like the  domestic  firm 
that  maximizes  its  market  value  given  the  rate  of  return  required  by  the 
shareholders.  If  we  solve the subsidiary’s maximization  problem  given  an 
exogenous  rate  of  return  required  by  its  shareholder-the  parent-the 
resulting  expressions  for the  cost  of  capital  or  the  effective  tax  rate  will 
summarize  the  contrasting  views  between  the  two  existing  positions 
regarding the marginal source of funds. With retained subsidiary earnings as 
the marginal source of  funds for foreign investment,  the effective tax rate is 
simply  the  host  country  tax  rate  reflecting  the  capitalization  of  the  home 
country tax into the  subsidiary  value.  Under the  more traditional transfers 
regime,  the effective  tax  rate  will be  a weighted  average  of the home and 
host tax rates in which the weights are the dividend payout ratio.’ 
Although the practice of isolating the subsidiary’s maximization problem 
is a convenient way of studying foreign fixed investment undertaken by the 
subsidiary or of summarizing the effects of tax policy toward foreign source 
income  on  direct  in~estment,~  it can be quite  misleading  when  we  try  to 
understand  the  overall  effects  of  the  home  country  tax  system  on  direct 
investment  flows. Tax policy can also affect direct investment through other 
channels, which can be best analyzed when we recognize that the subsidiary 
is one part  of  the international firm. Although the parent controls domestic 
operations in the home country, its major concern is the maximization of the 
overall profits of the international firm. Thus, to gain a proper understanding 
of  international  firm  behavior  and  corresponding  capital  flows,  it  is 
imperative to integrate the  subsidiary’s foreign  operation  with  the parent’s 
domestic  operation.  The profit-maximizing  international  firm  should  opti- 
mize over every relevant decision variable-domestic,  foreign, or intrafirm. 
Specifically,  in  addition  to  the  marginal  source  of  funds  for  foreign 
investment,  the  international  firm  should  optimize  over  the  location  of 
physical investment and the location of  external sources of  funds. 
The second major channel through  which domestic tax policy  influences 
direct  investment  is  through  its  effects  on the  relative  net  rates  of  return 
between  the  home  country  and  the  host  country.  The  direct  investment 
decision  of  international  firms can be  affected by  a variety  of  factors; for 
example, they  establish  branches  and  subsidiaries  abroad  to  secure  local 
markets, to have easy access to raw materials, and to take advantage of lower 
labor  costs.  In  sum,  direct  investment  arises  from expectations  of  higher 
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investment  location  by  affecting  the  relative  net  profitability  between 
different countries. 
In  order  to  derive  the  criteria  for intrafirm  investment  allocation,  Jun 
( 1988) integrates the subsidiary’s foreign operation and the parent’s domestic 
operation by  explicitly recognizing the ownership chain of the internaticmal 
firm-the  subsidiary-the  parent-the  domestic shareholders-and  the relevant 
rate of  return  required  by  each party’s  immediate owner.  Specifically, the 
rate of return used by the subsidiary in discounting its future profit stream is 
endogenously determined in the model in a way that maximizes the overall 
profits of the entire firm.4 In that process, we can sum the tax effects at the 
foreign-source income tax and the relative net return channels and explicitly 
derive the criteria for intrafirm investment allocation between domestic and 
foreign operations under each financing regime at the margin. With retained 
subsidiary earnings as the marginal source of funds, for example, the model 
predicts that the international firm should invest abroad until the net returns 
in the home and host countries are equalized; in this case, the domestic tax 
rate affects foreign investment only by  changing relative net returns. Since 
the relative net return channel itself is independent of the financing regime, 
the domestic tax system can affect direct investment even under the retained 
earnings regime. 
The paper also shows that the intrafirm allocation criteria do not include 
parameters associated with domestic shareholders, while in the long run the 
cost of foreign capital can be expressed as a function of the rate of return 
required by  the shareholders. This result implies that, although the foreign 
subsidiary  is  ultimately  owned  by  the  domestic  shareholders through  the 
ownership  chain,  the  investment  location  decision  is  a  purely  intrafirm 
variable that is not directly affected by the shareholders. I call this result the 
“parent  veil,”  which can be thought of  as a strong form of  the corporate 
veil.  In other words,  the shareholders will be concerned with  the ultimate 
rate of return on the overall operations paid through the domestic parent but 
may not care about transactions within the firm. This parent-veil proposition 
is supported by evidence presented in section 2.3. 
The third channel for tax effects on direct investment flows is related to 
the  way  taxation  affects  the  cost  of  external  funds  for  the  firm.  The 
discussion of the first two channels focused primarily on issues related to the 
allocation of  funds available within the international  firm-internal  funds.’ 
The parent concerned with overall profit maximization will be sensitive to 
any difference in the cost of  external funds between  countries. As long as 
local fund-raising in the host country is feasible and costs less than in the 
home  country,  the parent  will  have an  incentive  to let the subsidiary  rely 
more on this source and to reduce its transfers. 
Tax rules have always been a central focus of the debate regarding the real 
effects of corporate financial policy. Since income accruing within a firm and 
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is an incentive at the margin  for the firm to favor debt financing until the 
benefits from the tax deductibility  of interest payments are matched by the 
potential bankruptcy and agency costs associated with a higher debt-equity 
ratio.  For the international firm, the possibility of raising funds in different 
countries  can  create  another  opportunity  for tax  arbitrage.  The  intuition 
behind this can be easily illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that both 
the parent and the subsidiary borrow at the margin to raise funds. The cost of 
funds can be defined as COF = (1 -  t)i and COF* = (1 - t*)i*, where  i 
and  i*  are  the  interest  rates,  with  the  asterisk  denoting  a  host  country 
variable.  A  reduction  in  the  domestic  tax  rate  t  would  imply  that  local 
borrowing in the host country becomes a cheaper source of external funds, 
other things being equal. As a result, the subsidiary is more likely to resort 
to  local  borrowing  and  less likely to receive transfers by  the  parent  than 
before.  Thus,  tax  policy  can  influence  international  direct  investment  by 
affecting the relative cost of funds between countries. 
This relative cost of funds channel has not been recognized in the existing 
literature  but  can  be  quite  important  in  practice,  as  exemplified  in  the 
transactions  between  the  Netherlands  Antilles  finance  affiliates  and  their 
domestic parents. The next section discusses this example in detail. 
The preceding  discussion  suggests that  domestic tax  policy  can  have a 
significant effect on direct investment flows through various channels. What 
are the implications of this theoretical framework for empirical work in this 
area? 
First,  the  multichannel  analysis  suggests  that  empirical  work  specify 
which tax channel, which decision of the firm, or which tax policy it focuses 
on. Note that the relative net return channel and the relative net cost of funds 
channel are concerned with the choice of location between the home country 
and  the  host  country.  On the  other hand,  the  fact  that  U.S.  international 
firms’ global income is subject to domestic taxation implies that application 
of  the U.S.  corporate tax  rate  to foreign  source income is related  to the 
international  firm’s  overall  investment.  Thus,  while  the  reduction  of  the 
domestic corporate rate may increase foreign investment through its effect on 
overall investment (the first channel), it will have negative allocative effects 
on foreign investment by increasing domestic net returns and the net cost of 
funds  (the  second  and  third  channels).  In  addition  to  emphasizing  the 
different  ways  in  which  a  given  tax  policy  affects  investment,  this 
multichannel analysis also facilitates the evaluation of different types of tax 
policies.  For example,  the  foreign  tax  credit,  the investment tax credit or 
depreciation allowances, and the tax deductibility of interest payments affect 
international investment through different channels.6 
Second,  the  choice  of  an  empirical model  and  relevant  data  should  be 
consistent with the implications  derived from a theoretical  model.  In most 
previous  studies,  foreign investment  undertaken  by  the  foreign  subsidiary 
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Specifically,  previous  studies  employ  the  balance  of  payments  direct 
investment flows as a proxy for foreign fixed investment undertaken by  the 
subsidiaries. In practice, however, these two concepts can deviate from each 
other significantly; this difference gives rise to the need  to reexamine the 
empirical methodology employed in existing studies. 
2.2  Direct Investment Data 
International direct investment implies that an investor in one country has 
a  controlling  interest  in,  and  therefore  a  degree  of  influence  over  the 
management of, a business enterprise in another country. Specifically, direct 
investment involves the establishment of a new enterprise or the acquisition 
of  an existing enterprise and a lasting control of these facilities in a foreign 
country. What  constitutes a controlling interest can vary case by  case and 
thus  is  defined  somewhat arbitrarily. The U.S.  Department of  Commerce 
(1  985, 2) defines controlling interest as ownership or control of  10 percent or 
more of  the voting securities or an equivalent interest of  a foreign business 
enterprise. Any investment abroad that is not direct investment is considered 
portfolio investment. 
The  most  frequently  investigated  data  on  direct  investment  are  the 
Commerce  Department  balance  of  payments  (BOP)  direct  investment 
flows-both  U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in 
the United States. The BOP items consist primarily of transactions between 
parents and their affiliates. Specifically, direct investment capital outflows 
consist  of  equity  capital  outflows,  intercompany  debt  outflows,  and 
reinvested subsidiary earnings. Note that the first two items are summed as 
parent transfers in this study. 
One major reason that the recent trends in BOP direct investment flows 
have become  an important policy  concern is their implications for capital 
formation in the United States. Table 2.1 shows that BOP direct investment 
inflows in  1979 and outflows in 1981 each reached about a quarter of  U.S. 
net domestic investment in plant and equipment. Moreover, there has been a 
dramatic change in the direction and magnitude of  these flows in the early 
1980s. Although the first half of  the 1980s was a period characterized by a 
series  of  unusual  economic  events-high  real  interest  rates  and  a  deep 
recession, a sharp appreciation and later depreciation in the real value of the 
dollar,  and  huge  budget  and  trade  deficits-the  changes  in  investment 
incentives enacted in the tax legislation both in the early 1980s and in  1986 
have evoked concern over the nature and extent of the influence of tax policy 
on international flows. 
Specifically, in the  1980s, the direction of  BOP direct investment flows 
roughly coincides with what the relative net  return channel implies. In the 
early  1980s,  when  various  investment  incentives  were  enacted  in  tax 
legislation (the Economic Recovery Act of  1981 and  the  Tax  Equity  and 62  Joosung Jun 
Table 2.1  Ratios of International Direct Investment to U.S. Net Nonresidential 
Fixed Investment 
Foreign Direct 
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Note: These ratios were calculated on the basis of  data in U.S.  Department of  Commerce (1982, 
1984), various  issues  of  Survey  of  Current Business,  and  the  national  income  and  product 
accounts. 
Fiscal Responsibility  Act of  1982), the ratios of  direct  investment  outflows 
to domestic net nonresidential  fixed investment  dropped significantly while 
the corresponding ratios for capital inflows increased substantially.’  Note that 
the conventional  wisdom  in  the  early  1980s held  that, with  the extremely 
overvalued  dollar,  U.  S. firms  would  lose  competitiveness  and  thus  invest 
abroad instead of in the United States. The coincidence between tax changes 
and  international  investment  flows occurred again  in  1986. The  1986 Tax 
Reform  Act  abolished  many  favorable  incentive  provisions  like  the 
investment tax credit or the Accelerated  Cost Recovery System. Seemingly 
in response to this tax change, U.S. direct investment abroad bounced back 
sharply in 1986. The similar surge in foreign direct investment in the United 
States  may  seem counterintuitive, but  it occurred mainly  because  foreign 
firms tried  to take  advantage of  the  favorable  incentive provisions  before 
their expiration at the end of the year. 
Notice,  however,  that  the  BOP  direct  investment  measures  may  not 
exactly  represent  the  foreign  equivalent  of  domestic  investment  figures. 
Therefore, the denominator and the numerator of  the ratios presented in table 
2.1 may not be comparable. In fact, the BOP direct investment flows can be 
most accurately regarded  as $financial transactions  between  ajjifiated parties 
and  therefore  do  not  necessarily  represent  real  capital  expenditures  by 
foreign affiliates. To the extent that foreign subsidiaries resort to unaffiliated 
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underestimate real foreign investment. On the other hand, to the extent that 
direct investment flows do not finance real purchases of  investment goods, 
the BOP figures overestimate real foreign investment. Therefore, these BOP 
figures cannot be regarded as the exact foreign equivalent of  net domestic 
fixed investment, and, consequently, use of  these numbers  as  a proxy  for 
foreign  investment  as  in  table  2.1  should  be  viewed  with  caution. 
Nonetheless, citing the offsetting effects mentioned above, previous authors 
have tried to justify these figures as an alternative for true net foreign fixed 
investment.'  This practice deserves a closer scrutiny. 
First, as discussed in detail in Jun (1989b), the BOP flows may seriously 
underestimate the true degree of  foreign interests in U.S. assets because of 
the  presence  of  unaffiliated  financing  sources-most  important,  local 
borrowing in the host country. Therefore, even when the BOP flows are all 
used to finance real long-term investments, these figures will underestimate 
net foreign fixed investment to some extent. Some authors argue that local 
borrowing may be mostly short term in maturity and have little to do with 
long-term real  investment.  Using  foreign  affiliate  financial  and  operating 
data, however, Jun (1989b) shows that, though on average the majority of 
liabilities are short term in maturity, long-term debt is as prevalent as short- 
term debt for many industries.' 
Second, part of the BOP flows may have little to do with real productive 
investments. To the extent that BOP flows do not finance long-term physical 
investment, these figures will  overestimate foreign fixed investment. Such 
overestimation may  possibly  offset the  underestimation mentioned  above. 
Note, however,  that  the BOP figures represent net,  not  gross, flows. Any 
inflows  in  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad  will  be  netted  against  gross 
outflows. This negative entry can cause no problem as long as it represents 
decreased foreign fixed investment. However,  some foreign affiliates may 
raise  debt  capital  in  the  host  country  and  then  transfer  the  proceeds  to 
domestic parents. Such funds can be recorded as negative direct investment 
abroad in the BOP accounts but have little to do with productive activities. In 
this case, the BOP figures will underestimate net foreign fixed investment. 
The  most  noticeable  example  of  this  is  the  transactions  between  the 
Netherlands Antilles finance affiliates and their U.S. parents. These finance 
affiliates have  been  established to  provide U.S. parents with  a  means  of 
raising  funds  abroad  without  having  the  associated  interest  payments 
subjected to  a  30  percent  U.S.  withholding tax  on  interest payments to 
foreigners.  Since  1977,  the  funds  reloaned  to  U.S.  parents  have  been 
included in  the BOP accounts as negative U.S.  direct investment abroad. 
Table 2.2 summarizes total U.S. capital outflows and the transactions with 
Netherlands Antilles finance affiliates for the last several years.  Note  that 
parent transfers are composed of  both equity investment and intercompany 
debt  flows.  In  1982,  for  example,  the  negative  debt  flows  vis-a-vis 
Netherlands Antilles affiliates can explain most of  the total change in that 64  Joosung Jun 
Table 2.2  U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and Transactions with Netherlands 
Antillean Finance Affiliates (total equity debt) 
Total Direct Investment  Netherlands Antilles Affiliates 
Direct Investment  Direct Investment 
Abroad  Parent Transfers  Abroad  Parent Transfers 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1982  -2.4  -3.7  9.7  -13.4  -8.6  -9.4  4.2  -13.6 
1983  .4  -6.8  4.9  -11.7  -3.1  -4.1  1.4  -5.7 
1984  2.8  -5.7  1.7  -6.9  -2.0  -2.8  1.0  -3.8 
1985  17.3  -1.1  -2.2  1.1  4.2  3.4  -.8  4.2 
1986  28.0  9.1  .4  8.7  5.1  5.4  1 .o  4.4 
Nore:  Though  retained  earnings  data  are  suppressed  in  this  table,  they  can  be  obtained  by 
subtracting parent transfers (cols. 2 or 6) from total direct investment (cols. 1 or 5). 
category. It is not hard to see that these debt flows substantially contributed 
to  reducing  total  BOP  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad  in  some  years, 
especially in the early 1980s. The U.S. withholding tax was repealed in July 
1984, and  the  Netherlands Antilles intercompany debt  accounts began  to 
show positive entries in 1985, implying that U.S. parents have been paying 
off debts to the affiliates. 
Besides the reasons mentioned above, there are a host of other factors that 
may contribute to the skepticism about any meaningful comparison between 
the  BOP  flows  and  domestic  fixed  investment  figures,  including  book 
valuation practices, depreciation calculations, changing coverage of surveys, 
and exchange rate fluctuations.  lo 
Considering all these factors, I believe that the best strategy for utilizing 
existing  investment  data  is  explicitly  to  distinguish  between  the  foreign 
investment undertaken by  the subsidiary and the direct investment of  the 
international  firm  and  to  develop  empirical  models  based  on  distinct 
theoretical considerations in  each  case.  First,  if  foreign  fixed  investment 
undertaken  by  subsidiaries is  the  major  focus  of  a  study,  actual  capital 
expenditures by  subsidiaries, rather than  the  BOP financial flows, are the 
appropriate data to be  used.  In this case, the isolation of  the subsidiary’s 
maximization problem is a perfectly justifiable modeling strategy, but one 
must  not  forget  any  possible  source  of  funds  for  foreign  investment, 
especially  local  borrowing,  which  is  not  included  in  the  BOP  direct 
investment data by definition. Second, if  one is interested in the effects of 
taxes on international investment capital flows, then the BOP figures are still 
the  best  alternative despite the  suggested measurement problems.  In  this 
case,  the more difficult problem is to develop a theoretical framework in 
which  all possible  channels for tax  effects can  be  incorporated. It  is this 
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One  caveat  is  that,  in  this  case,  contrary  to  popular  belief,  even  the 
inclusion of  the Netherlands Antilles transactions in the direct investment 
figures  can  be  perfectly  justified  since  those  financial  transactions  are 
consistent with profit maximization by the international firm, as discussed in 
the context of the relative net cost of funds. In reality, in the early 1980s, the 
Netherlands Antilles finance affiliates could borrow at a lower cost abroad 
(mostly  in  Eurobond  markets)  and  transfer  funds  to  U.S.  parent  firms 
without incumng the withholding tax on subsequent interest payments. The 
popular argument against the inclusion of  these data in the BOP accounts is 
based on the inappropriate identification of direct investment flows with real 
foreign  investment  undertaken  by  foreign  subsidiaries.  This  Netherlands 
Antilles example clearly shows that an adequate theoretical framework is a 
prerequisite for the correct specification of  an empirical model and for the 
proper  utilization  of  existing  data  in  studying  the  complex  subject  of 
international investment. 
2.3  Estimation 
The  diversity of  ways  in  which  domestic  tax  policy  can  affect direct 
investment flows suggests that  the evaluation of  this  subject is ultimately 
an empirical matter. As discussed earlier, choosing the correct specification 
and  appropriate data  for  an  empirical  model  critically  hinges  on  proper 
theoretical underpinnings. Since my  major focus is on the effects of  taxes 
on  direct  investment  flows,  I  use  the  BOP  direct  investment  capital 
outflows as  the  dependent  variable  in  the  regression  analysis.  Since the 
BOP  direct  investment  data  basically  represents  intrafirm  transactions 
between  affiliated  parties  and  the  tax  changes  in  the  1980s  are  largely 
reflected  in  the  U.S.  net  rate  of  return,  the main  focus of  my  empirical 
model is on relative net rates of  return.  However,  unlike previous studies 
that consider only the net return channel, this model explicitly incorporates 
the net  cost of  funds,  another channel for the tax  effects on the intrafirm 
allocation of  investment funds. 
In  order  to  estimate  the  tax  effects  on  investment  flows  through  the 
relative net return channel, we need some measure of  the net rate of return 
on domestic investment in the United States. The conventional method is to 
use the same net-of-tax return variables as employed in estimation of  U.S. 
domestic investment equations.  However,  among several available alterna- 
tives,  not  all  these  variables can  be  a  good candidate for  our purposes. 
Again, as in the case of selecting proper direct investment data, the choice of 
an appropriate net  return variable should also involve rigorous theoretical 
considerations. Specifically, two basic criteria are proposed for which a net 
return variable is to be evaluated. 
First, the variable should capture the relevant incentive effects for firms 
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effective  tax  rate  differs from the average  net  return  or effective tax  rate 
since  incentive  provisions  like  the  investment  tax  credit  and  accelerated 
depreciation allowances are relevant only to new investments, not to existing 
capital.  Although the use of the average tax rate has some advantages, like 
capturing the effects of  special provisions or the lack of full loss offset in the 
tax law, the marginal tax rate is more relevant in capturing incentive effects 
on marginal investment decisions. 
The  second  and  more  relevant  criterion  is  related  to  the  intrafirm- 
transaction  nature of  direct  investment. As  discussed  in  section  2.1,  one 
pivotal aspect of international direct investment is the ownership chain of the 
international firm: the subsidiary-the  parent-the  shareholders. The decision 
of  investment  location  is  a  purely  intrafirm  variable  that  is  not  directly 
affected  by  the shareholders. Although  the foreign subsidiary  is ultimately 
owned by the domestic shareholders, the “parent veil”  seems to be virtually 
impenetrable.”  Thus, the net return  measure in my model  is supposed  to 
capture the incentive effects on the part of the corporate, not the portfolio, 
investor. Differences  in the measurement  of net profitability can be used to 
distinguish the “corporate- investor”  returns from the  “portfolio-investor” 
returns. In a corporate-investor  model, investment is explicitly made by the 
corporation. In a portfolio-investor  model, on the other hand, the economy 
is treated like a black box in which the investment mechanism is obscure but 
that produces the plausible result that more capital flows into an asset when 
the rate of return on that asset is high. 
The net return variables used for estimating domestic investment equations 
first in Feldstein (1982) and recently  in Feldstein and Jun (1987) are good 
examples of these two types.  One variable (RN) is the real net-of-tax return 
received  by  the providers  of  debt and equity capital. This RN variable  is 
calculated  by  subtracting  from the pretax  return  on nonfinancial  corporate 
capital the ratio of the taxes paid by the corporations, their shareholders, and 
their creditors to the capital  stock. Thus, RN is an example of the average 
net return since it measures the net return on existing corporate capital. RN 
is  also an  example of  the  portfolio-investor  model  since it  measures  the 
return to portfolio investors. Interestingly,  virtually  all previous  regression 
studies used this RN variable as the U.S. net rate of return. 
The other net  return  variable  (MPNR) is the maximum net  return  that 
firms can afford to pay providers of debt and equity capital. This “maximum 
potential net return”  variable  can be best interpreted  as the internal rate of 
return of  a project  in an economy with taxes  and inflation.  Changes in tax 
rules, inflation,  and pretax  profitability all alter the maximum potential net 
return and therefore the incentive to invest.  l2 MPNR differs from RN in two 
fundamental  ways. First, the investment  decision  is explicitly  made by the 
corporation. Second, this  variable  measures the  prospective  yield  on new 
marginal  investment  rather  than  the  yield  on  existing  capital.  MPNR, 
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sequently, better satisfies the two criteria for the model than RN, an average, 
portfolio-investor  net return variable. 
In  an  attempt  to  test  the  “parent-veil’’  hypothesis,  I  also  estimate 
equations with  a marginal  but  portfolio-investor variable.  Consider first a 
very simple economy in which there is no taxation or inflation. Each share of 
stock claims the ownership of a single unit of capital and the earnings that it 
produces. A simple model of share valuation implies that the price that the 
individual would be willing to pay per share (QM) would make the marginal 
product of capital (F’[KJ)  equal to the net return he would receive per dollar 
invested in alternative  assets plus a risk premium  or simply some required 
rate  of  return  (R). Then  the  investor’s  indifference  condition  becomes 
F’(K)IQM  = R. From  the  perspective  of  the  corporate  investor,  F’(K) 
represents the maximum return that he can pay to the providers of capital or 
the marginal efficiency of capital in the standard textbook  model, while R 
represents  the  cost  of  capital  or  simply  the  rate  of  interest.  In  a  more 
complex and realistic economy with taxes and inflation, we can calculate the 
marginal share value (QM) by replacing F’(K) with the maximum potential 
net earnings (MPNRE) that can be paid out to the equity investor. Using the 
MPNR data and a given financial structure (the debt-capital  ratio), we can 
derive MPNRE. As a realistic proxy for the cost of  funds (R),  we can use 
some fixed rate of  return required by  the equity holder or the after-tax safe 
interest rate plus  a risk premium.  Jun  (I  989a) discusses different  types  of 
QM series based  on various tax  assumptions and risk  premia.  The major 
point here is that QM uses exactly the same data on earnings,  taxes,  and 
inflation as  used  for MPNR  but  employs the  perspective  of  the portfolio 
investor. Thus, comparison of estimation results for QM to those for MPNR 
may provide information concerning the parent-veil hypothesis. 
Table  2.3  summarizes  the  three  variables  outlined  above  by  their 
respective  characteristics.  While  previous  studies  focus  only  on  the  RN 
variable, here direct investment equations are estimated  using all three  net 
return variables. Among the three variables, it is expected that the MPNR 
variable  performs  best  in  estimating  the  tax  effects  on  direct  investment 
flows since it is the forward-looking marginal corporate-investor net rate of 
return. Before reporting the results, however, a few caveats are in order. 
First,  a  significant  coefficient  on  the  net-of-tax  return  itself  does  not 
necessarily  mean that direct investment  flows are sensitive to tax changes. 
Thus, we need a reasonable decomposition of the effect of net return changes 
into the effect of the change in tax rules and the effect of the change in the 
pretax rate of return.  Unlike RN, which reflects changes in both the pretax 
return and the effective tax rate, the MPNR variable assumes a fixed pretax 
rate return. Thus, MPNR has a clear advantage in that it focuses on changes 
in the tax law and in inflation.13 
Second, in estimating  domestic investment  equations,  Feldstein and Jun 
(1987) use the difference between the maximum net return that firms can pay 68  Joosung Jun 
Table 2.3  Alternative Net Return Variables 
Portfolio Investor  Corporate Investor 
Average return  RN 
Marginal return  QM 
... 
MPNR 
(MPNR) and the actual cost of funds (COF). COF is taken to be a weighted 
average of the costs of  debt and of  equity funds, with the weights equal to 
the  debt-capital  ratios.  In  estimating  direct  investment,  however,  that 
specification will no longer be valid since U.S. multinational firms can raise 
investment funds in host countries as well as in the United States. As shown 
in section 2.1, tax changes can influence the intercompany flow of funds by 
affecting the relative net cost of funds between countries. To  the extent that 
host  country external funds  (COF*) are cheaper, the  parent  will  have  an 
incentive to have its affiliate depend more on local funds in the host country. 
Therefore, the correct and complete specification would include COF-COF* 
and MPNR-MPNR*, which represent the relative net cost of  funds channel 
and the relative net return channel, respectively. In the absence of the COF* 
and  MPNR* variables,  only MPNR  and  COF are included,  of  course as 
separate terms. 
Both MPNR and COF should relay some information about the allocative 
effect of  taxes in equations using the BOP direct investment data. However, 
MPNR,  which  represents the  allocation of  internal funds,  is  expected to 
explain the BOP data better than COF,  which represents the  allocation of 
external funds. The BOP flows-the  sum of retained subsidiary earnings and 
parent transfers-can  be  best  interpreted as representing the allocation of 
internal funds within the entire international firm. As discussed in detail in 
Jun (1989b), parent transfers may be drawn from external funds (e.g., funds 
borrowed by the parent from unaffiliated sources) but can be best thought of 
as  internal  funds  of  the  parent.  Therefore,  while  I  expect  a  negative 
coefficient on the MPNR variable in an estimated equation, I do not expect 
the  COF variable to  reveal  statistically significant information about  the 
relative cost of  fund channel in the absence of  COF*,  which  is probably 
more directly relevant to the parent's transfer decision in practice. 
Table 2.4 presents the estimated equations relating the ratio of  U.S. direct 
investment abroad in the balance of  payments accounts to GNP to the net 
return variables discussed above. As in previous studies, separate equations 
are  estimated for  the  two  components-retained  subsidiary earnings  and 
parent transfers-of  direct investment. This practice allows me to compare 
my  estimates with previous ones and also provides indirect evidence on the 
marginal source of funds for foreign investment. In all previous estimation 
studies (Hartman 1981, 1985; Boskin and Gale 1987), only the equations for 
retained earnings show sensitivity to net return ~ariab1es.I~  This result seems 69  U.S.  Tax Policy and Direct Investment Abroad 
Table 2.4  Estimates of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Equations 
Parent Transfers  Retained Earnings 










































































Note: Dependent  variables  are retained  eamings  X  1OOO/U.S.  GNP and parent  transfers  X 
lOOO/U.S. GNP, respectively. All explanatory variables are one-period lagged. Sample period is 
1965-86  for  all  equations.  The  equations  are  estimated  with  a  first-order  autocorrelation 
correction,  and the  simultaneously  estimated  autocorrelation  coefficient  is  presented  as the 
coefficient of  the variable u. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. RDIA: actual net return 
on direct investment; RN: net return on U.S. nonfinancial corporate capital; MPNR: maximum 
potential net return; COF: cost of funds; QM: marginal q. 
consistent with the tax  capitalization view that retained earnings should be 
the  marginal  source  of  funds  for  mature  subsidiaries.  In  Jun  (1989d), 
however, I refute this view using evidence based on individual firm  data and 
argue that parent transfers should be the marginal source of  funds for the 
majority of  subsidiaries. 
Included  in  each  equation  is  the  “actual  net  average return”  (RDIA: 
actual after-foreign-tax direct investment earnings divided by  direct invest- 
ment position) to represent any specific incentives associated with foreign 
investment that are not to be captured by the domestic net return. This RDIA 
variable may be regarded as a proxy for MPNR*, possibly mitigating the 
missing variable bias associated with the net return channel.  Since studies 
generally indicate a lag that peaks at twelve to eighteen months between 
changes  in  the  determinants of  investment  and  subsequent  changes  in 
investment, the explanatory variables are one-year lagged as conventionally 
done in estimation of domestic investment. Note that all previous works do 
not  lag the  independent variables, an  omission that  I  believe  is  a major 
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As shown in columns  1 and 4 of table 2.4, the coefficients on the average 
yield on existing capital (RN) are very  small in size, incorrect in sign, and 
statistically  insignificant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  maximum  potential  net 
return for the  corporate investor  (MPNR) has sizable and  correctly  signed 
coefficients, as shown in columns 2 and 4. It suggests that U.S. tax changes 
can have significant effects on U.S. multinational firms’ investment abroad. 
However, the t-statistics for MPNR in the retained-earnings  equation is not 
large enough to be significant, while the t-value in the transfer equation is 
relatively  sizable.  This  fact  supports the  view  that parent  transfers  are the 
marginal source of funds for the majority of  subsidiaries. In any event, the 
results  also  confirm  my  initial  guess  that  MPNR-the  marginal  and 
corporate-investor  variable-is  a  more  appropriate  variable  than  RN-the 
average  and  portfolio-investor  variable-in  estimating  tax  effects  on 
intrafinn investment allocation between parents and subsidiaries. 
While even the best net return measure for our purposes (MPNR) fails to 
have significant coefficients for any retained earnings equation,  the transfers 
equations  show  consistently  higher  R2s  than  their  retained  earnings 
counterparts. This result provides indirect support  for the claim that parent 
transfers are the marginal source of funds for foreign investment. 
Columns  3  and  6  show the  estimated  equations  with  the  QM variable. 
Neither equation succeeds in producing significant coefficients. The size of 
the coefficients  is small, as in  other Q-investment  equations,  although my 
Q-variables are not based on the adjustment cost function. Considering that 
MPNR and QM use virtually identical data except that each model is based 
on different  types  of  investors,  this  result  provides  further support to  the 
parent-veil  argument. 
In  all  equations,  the  lagged  RDIAs  fail  to  produce  any  significant 
coefficients.  This result can be contrasted with the significant coefficients on 
the corresponding variable  (RDFI: actual return on foreign direct investment 
in the United  States) in similarly defined equations regarding foreign direct 
investment  in  the  United  States  presented  in  Jun  (1989~).  One potential 
explanation comes from the presumption that RDIA or RFDI is supposed to 
capture  the  return  on  existing  investment  projects.  When  we  decompose 
BOP direct investment into “inflows  to existing affiliates”  and “funds used 
for acquisition and e~tablishment,”’~  RDIA or RFDI may  be more directly 
relevant to the first type of funds, while the host country net return (the U.S. 
net  return  in the  case  of  studying  foreign  direct  investment  in the  United 
States)  may  be  related  more  to  the  latter  type.  Thus,  the  contrasting 
performance of RDIA and RFDI might be due to the different composition of 
the BOP inflows and outflows between these two types of direct investment 
opportunities-new  and  old.  However,  a  more  convincing  explanation  is 
related to the RDIA variable itself. As noticed earlier, U.S. direct investment 
position  and  income-the  denominator  and  the  numerator  of  RDIA, 
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valuation  of  the investment  position  and currency-conversion effects.  The 
data for the RFDI variable may be subject to fewer problems. 
I have not obtained reliable results  for the COF variable;  this outcome, 
however, is not surprising, partly because BOP figures are more relevant to 
the net return channel as discussed earlier and also because most of  the tax 
changes in question are associated with the profitability of investment rather 
than with the cost side. 
How do these results compare with previous works? Hartman (1981) and, 
recently, Boskin and Gale (1987) have estimated the same specification as in 
columns  1  and  3  using  the  same  type  of  data-both  investment  and  tax 
data-but  they  do  not  lag  the  explanatory  variables  at  all.  For  the 
retained-earnings equations, they typically report very large and statistically 
significant coefficients  on RDIA  and  very  high  R2s (larger than  .9 in  all 
cases).16 Their transfer equations show a very poor fit. These results are in 
sharp  conflict  with  my  theoretical  predictions  and  empirical  findings.  A 
closer look  at their estimation shows, however,  that their significant results 
seem to be the product of spurious correlation. Specifically, for the retained 
earnings  equations,  retained  earnings  data  are  used  to  construct  both  the 
dependent  variable  (the ratio of retained  earnings to GNP) and RDIA,  the 
independent  variable  (retained  earnings  are  the  major  component  of  the 
numerator  of  RDIA).  My suspicion  is also supported by the fact that it is 
hard to believe that a 90 percent R2 can be obtained from such parsimonious 
specification, that the same variable (RDIA) shows such drastically different 
results in the retained earnings and transfers equations. It is also hard to find 
serious theoretical arguments for their findings. One caveat is in order. Even 
if we believe their results, the coefficients of RDIA have nothing to do with 
the U.S. tax system. So, in fact, they  failed to find any “tax  effects”  on 
U.S. capital outflows, contrary to their claim. 
2.4  Summary 
The analysis presented in this paper shows that U.S. tax policy can have a 
significant  effect  on  direct  investment  capital  flows  through  various 
channels. I stress that a sensible choice of model specification and data in an 
empirical  model entails rigorous  theoretical  underpinnings.  In particular,  I 
emphasize  the  difference  between  foreign  investment  undertaken  by  the 
subsidiary and direct investment of the entire international firm  and the need 
to use  different  theoretical  frameworks to handle each problem.  I  present 
estimated equations relating the BOP direct investment outflows to various 
measures of the U.S. net rate of return. Specifically, the evidence shows that 
U.S.  tax policy toward domestic investment can have significant effects on 
U.S. direct investment outflows by influencing the relative net rate of return 
between  the  United  States and  abroad.  Among  various specifications,  the 
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best, which is consistent with the implications derived from my  theoretical 
framework. On the basis of these findings and of the estimation of a domestic 
investment equation with separate MPNR  and  COF variables presented in 
Feldstein and  Jun  (19871,  we can say that a reduction of  sixteen cents of 
transfers made by U.S. parent firms occurs for every dollar increase in U.S. 
domestic investment. The findings in this study also support the claims that 
parent transfers are the major marginal source of funds for foreign investment 
and that there exists a strong form of  the corporate veil-the  parent veil- 
between the foreign subsidiary and the domestic shareholders. 
Notes 
1. In practice,  local borrowing in the host country can be an important source of 
financing foreign investment. The presence of local funds may also have implications 
for the choice between parent transfers and retained earnings at the margin.  See Jun 
(1989d). 
2. I assume that the home country rate is larger than the host country rate. 
3.  Note that I explicitly distinguish between foreign investment undertaken by the 
subsidiary  and  direct  investment  made  by  the  parent.  Foreign  investment  can  be 
financed through other sources than direct investment,  while direct investment may 
not necessarily finance foreign fixed investment. 
4.  In equilibrium, the denominator of marginal q for foreign capital is equal to the 
numerator of marginal q for domestic capital. See Jun (1988). 
5.  For a domestic firm, internal funds are retained earnings, while external funds 
are raised through new shares and bonds. Similarly, internal funds for an international 
firm consist of retained earnings of both the parent and the subsidiary. 
6. The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  includes  provisions  reducing  the  statutory 
corporate tax rate, repealing the investment tax credit, and restricting the foreign tax 
credit and tax deferral.  The overall effect on direct investment is not evident since 
these policies can have offsetting effects.  However,  such a combination of  policies 
may have implications for the composition of  investment.  For example,  relatively 
more equipment investment may be undertaken by  foreign subsidiaries. 
7.  The absolute level of direct investment flows also shows the same trend. 
8.  For a summary of previous arguments, see Hartman (1984, 486). 
9.  In finance, insurance, and wholesale industries, short-term liabilities dominate, 
while, in manufacturing, mining, and real estate industries, long-term debt occupies a 
significant portion of total liabilities (about 50 percent for manufacturing). 
10.  For a discussion of  potential problems  associated with benchmark  data,  see 
Boskin and Gale (1987).  Hartman (1984) correctly argues that the BOP figures are 
more  comparable  to  net  investment  figures  since  retained  earnings  are  net  of 
depreciation,  though this is in book value.  Exchange rate  movements  in the early 
1980s may  have  affected  the  BOP  figures  in  two  ways.  First,  changing  relative 
competitiveness may have influenced direct investment activities. Second, as for U.S. 
direct  investment abroad, there may well have been a currency  conversion effect. 
Foreign earnings may have been  understated  when being translated  into the dollar 
value in the early  1980s, when the dollar was highly overvalued. 
11. This point is rigorously proved in Jun (1988). 73  U.S. Tax Policy and Direct Investment Abroad 
12. I  constructed  both  the  constant-profit  version  (MPNR)  and  the  varying- 
profitability version (MPNRVP) of the maximum net return. The MPNRVP variable 
assumes that firms adjust their  assumed pretax rate of return from year to year in 
proportion  to that  year's  actual  pretax  profitability  of  capital  in  the  nonfinancial 
corporate sector. In this study, I use MPNR to focus only on the tax change. 
13.  See n.  12 above. 
14.  I do not even bother  to include my  replication of their  findings since most 
previous estimation studies share the same basic specification and produce the same 
qualitative results. I also estimated equations with total direct investment but failed to 
find  any  significant  covariance  effects  between  the  two  components  of  direct 
investment. 
15. Jun  (1989b) discusses  this issue for foreign direct investment in the United 
States. 
16.  Some of their equations show small but significant coefficients on RN, but I 
failed to have any significant results for this variable using updated data. 
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Comment  Michael P.  Dooley 
Jun’s paper examines balance of payments data to estimate the effect of taxes 
on direct investment.  In doing so, the author is forced  to utilize  “flow  of 
funds” financial data to test the implications of a macro model. While there 
are circumstances  where  this  is  appropriate,  these  circumstances are quite 
special and are unlikely to be present in the data used in this paper. 
Consider,  for  example,  a  basic  closed-economy  macro  model,  which 
relates after-tax rates of return to savings and real investment but does not set 
out  the  details  of  financial  intermediation.  In  general,  a  complex Jow  of 
funds from savers to investors through financial intermediaries leaves behind 
a  multiple  set  of  financial  assets  and  liabilities.  Flow  of  funds  accounts 
follow savings of  a household  or a firm to a commercial bank,  then  to  a 
money-market fund, then to commercial paper, and ultimately to purchase of 
an  investment  good.  The predictions  of  the  macro  model,  however,  are 
Michael  P.  Dooley  is  chief  of  the  External  Adjustment  Division, Research  Department, 
International Monetary Fund. The views presented here are those of the author and should not 
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Fig. C2.la 
of U.S. dollars) 
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments  and U.S. Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
U.S. gross direct investment and the current account (in billions 
invariant to the route from households or firms to investors. One reason that 
flow  of  funds data are seldom used  for economic analysis (though for the 
United States such data exist) is that the route savings takes to the investor 
can be very unstable. New financial markets open up, competitive conditions 
change,  and, perhaps most  important,  taxation and regulation  of  financial 
intermediaries and financial markets provide strong incentives to reroute the 
flow of  funds. 
For  an  open  economy,  the  problem  of  interpreting  a  flow  of  funds 
accounting framework is even more difficult. The counterpart to real savings 
in the closed economy includes for the open economy net exports of  goods 
and services or, more conventionally, the current account balance. But the 
problem relating  net  savings  flows  to  the  flow  of  financial  funds  across 
national borders is truly daunting. 
The capital account in the balance of payments is a flow of funds account. 
It  measures  the  dollar  value  of  gross  financial  transactions  involving 76  Joosung Jun 
residents and nonresidents.  The direct investment  data are  financial capital 
flows as reported by a subset of reporters who own more than 10 percent of 
the voting shares of the counterparty  in that transaction. 
Now,  if  the  financial  transactions  reported  by  direct  investors  were 
representative  of  other investors, it  might  be  possible  to  interpret  foreign 
direct  investors  as  contributing  to  capital  formation.  However,  it  is  also 
possible  that  transactions  reported  by  direct  investors  are  systematically 
offset by transactions among other groups of investors.  As shown in figure 
C2.la, the  United  States has  borrowed  heavily  from the  rest  of  the  world 
since  1982.  It  is  also  the  case  that  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad  has 
increased, but so has foreign direct investment in the United States. Clearly, 
as shown in figure C2.lb, net direct investment has been dominated by net 
inflows through other financial markets. 
Returning to a closed economy model for simplicity, we can imagine two 
important  types  of  taxes  that  might  influence  the  relations  among  various 
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Fig. C2.lb  U.S. net direct investment and the current account (in billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Sources: IMF, Balance of  Payments and U.S.  Federal Reserve Bulletin. 77  U.S. Tax  Policy and Direct Investment Abroad 
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Fig. C2.2a  U.S. gross short-term bank reported capital flows and the current 
account (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
Sources:  IMF, Balance of  Payments and U.S.  Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
source, for example, a real estate tax.  Another would tax earnings from a 
particular type of financial position, say, bond interest. Both types of taxation 
might discourage savings and, in turn,  investment  in a given country. But 
suppose that, instead of directly evaluating the effect on savings (as recorded 
in national income accounts), we looked at the increase in direct investment 
reported by households as measured by purchases of  equities. 
The real estate tax would presumably discourage all types of investment, 
including that financed by equity, and, other things being equal, an increase 
in the tax would suggest a fall in both investment and the accumulation of 
equity by households. A tax on bond interest would be, in part, avoided by 
switching to equity claims. To the extent that bonds were still held, the tax 
would also discourage savings and, in turn, investment. But equity holdings 
would increase, and, if we were using this as a measure of investment, we 
would get the wrong answer. 
In an international context, both kinds of taxes change frequently. Thus, 
the type of financial capital flows associated with a net transfer of  savings 78  Joosung Jun 
120 
Olhw ”el 8seIs 
100 
80  80 
60  60 
-loot 
-””I  -140 
-160 
1970  71  12  73  74 75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88 
Fig.  C2.2b  U.S.  net  capital  flows  and  the  current  account  (in  billions  of 
U.S. dollars) 
Sources:  IMF, Balance of Payments and U.S.  Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
has  shown  a  great  deal  of  instability.  In  addition  to  important  financial 
innovations  and  changes  in  tax  and  regulatory  incentives,  governments 
intervene on an important scale in order to influence exchange rates. Even if 
one  is  skeptical  about  the  power  of  official  transactions  to  influence 
exchange rates, there is no doubt that large-scale private capital movements 
are the necessary counterpart  to intervention.  As shown in figure C2.2a, b, 
the changing  structure for these  flows  in  the face of  a growing  net  capital 
inflow  to  the  United  States  as  measured  by  the  current  account  balance 
suggests that none of these financial flows are likely to be good measures of 
the contribution of  groups of  investors to capital formation. 